In April 1862, David G. Farragut led a U.S. naval squadron up the Mississippi River. His forces, ocean-steaming warships, improvised gunboats, and mortar vessels, invested Forts Jackson and St. Philip before steaming past the positions, destroying the Confederacy’s naval flotilla supporting the position in the process. New Orleans then quickly fell, remaining occupied by Union military forces for the rest of the war. The loss of New Orleans left the Confederacy without its largest city, including its major shipyards and iron works, a loss that would significantly impact its warfighting abilities.
Interestingly, this quick loss indirectly provided significant insight into how the Confederacy built up defenses for the Crescent City. The city’s loss was so great that the Confederate War Department ordered an investigation into its loss, with the intention of determining the culpability of Major General Mansfield Lovell in the city’s fall. A full investigation was launched in 1863, culminating in a complete court of inquiry. The Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, Relative to the Fall of New Orleans was published by the Confederate Congress and printed in 1864, becoming one of the few printed records investigating the root causes of Confederate failures to defend a major city.
Ironically, because New Orleans was captured by Union forces so early in the war, the court of inquiry conducted its investigation without interference, and was able to complete its report before the Confederacy’s collapse. As the court of inquiry sought to determine the culpability of General Lovell in the city’s loss, it contains significant testimony and evidence gathering regarding the strength of Confederate military and naval forces in the Crescent City, as well as deep discussions on how these forces operated together. Extensive interviews with military and naval commanders, as well as with businessmen, shipyard operators, industry leaders, and city leaders, were conducted by the court of inquiry. They showed that naval commanders from numerous different organizations competed for manpower, supplies, and shipyard facilities, leading to a less effective naval flotilla to effectively challenge Farragut’s Union squadron.
Ultimately, the court of inquiry published in their collected proceedings that General Mansfield Lovell was not culpable regarding the loss of New Orleans. From a naval standpoint, anyone looking at understanding how the Confederate Navy sought to build a riverine flotilla on the Mississippi River Valley, what challenges it faced regarding supplies and manpower, or exploring how other naval organizations like Louisiana’s Navy or the River Defense Fleet impacted the establishment of an operating naval squadron, needs to give the Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry Relative to the Fall of New Orleans a close examination.
To learn more about how Confederate naval forces were organized at New Orleans, read Neil P. Chatelain’s article “Crisis in Command at New Orleans” in the Spring 2021 issue of Civil War Navy—The Magazine.
Confederate Congress. Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, Relative to the Fall of New Orleans (Richmond, VA: R.M. Smith Public Printer, 1864).
Neil P. Chatlain’s article “Crisis in Command at New Orleans” in the Spring 2021 issue
of Civil War Navy—The Magazine.